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Mary B. Rose, Terry Love and Mike Parsons 
 
Abstract 
This article looks at the role of path dependency in the design of outdoor 
clothing and equipment, from the perspective of changing and overlapping 
industrial clusters in Lancashire and Sheffield, from the 1960s. It 
demonstrates that, unlike the fashion market, design in mountaineering 
clothing and equipment was originally based heavily upon functionality and 
hence on user innovation. It shows that skills and knowledge which evolved 
during the industrial revolution, in both industrial areas, were vitally important 
to the development of internationally competitive mountaineering equipment 
firms. It was, however, the way in which these sources of knowledge were 
combined with sporting expertise that contributed to the design of innovative 
functional products. In addition, fundamental changes occurred in the 
relationship between manufacturers and their customers and these were vital 
to the success of this process, marking a departure from past practice. 
Keywords: Design history, lead user-innovation, mountaineering, path 
dependency, physical geography  
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Introduction 
During the 1960s the North of England, bordering on the Pennines, and 
including north Cheshire, Manchester, North Lancashire, Derbyshire and 
Sheffield, became the home of a number of highly innovative design-based 
companies, producing clothing and equipment for mountaineering and 
outdoor sports. These included Karrimor, Troll and Mountain Equipment 
which, during the 1970s, emerged as international brands. This article focuses 
on the factors which shaped the design process and design choices in this 
sector. Drawing especially on case studies of Karrimor and Troll, it explores 
the extent to which these were linked to the interplay between the industrial, 
and sporting history and physical geography of the Pennine region. In a sector 
where, in this period, design was originally moulded by functionality rather 
than fashion, this article assesses the impact which these design trends had 
on marketing. The article is divided into four substantive sections, tracking 
both the continuities and the changes associated with design choices. In the 
first section the characteristics and relationship between the industries of 
Lancashire and Sheffield nineteenth century industrial clusters are tracked. 
This is followed by a discussion of the legacy of the industrial past and its 
relationship to the shifting focus of British climbing from the interwar period 
onwards. These sections form the backdrop to the case studies of Karrimor 
and Troll which are used to illuminate the formation of design choices in the 
trade and the way in which functionality became linked to marketing strategies 
in the 1970s. In a final section conclusions are drawn which demonstrate the 
strong relationship between development of design and industrial and sporting 
 2
history and physical geography. 
Industrial Clusters and Industrial Revolution 
 
 Industrial districts are distinguished by the closely interrelated evolution of 
skills, knowledge, technologies and products, based upon path dependent 
characteristics. Path dependency can be defined as: 
The influence of past events and of the states they bring about must be 
communicated –like the deepening of wheel ruts by each successive 
vehicle –through some definite chain of intervening casual events, 
effects and resultant states –down to the present state, whence they can 
be passed on to future events’. 2  
Tacit knowledge, based on learning by doing, is embedded in communities 
and lies at the heart of theories of path dependency.3 Learning by doing within 
industrial regions was reinforced by communities of practice, where shared 
experience reinforced learning, product and technology development.4 This is 
not the same as saying there is something predetermined about the 
development of innovation or design. Instead, it emphasises the way that 
history matters in the evolution of innovation and the effect it has upon 
choices. Regions, their technology and their products have a distinctive 
history, shaped by the knowledge and experience of those working within 
them. This means that responses to change and its initiation are based on 
social processes, which are also shaped by the past. These are, in turn, 
intimately related to the industrial legacies of two overlapping nineteenth 
 3
century industrial clusters, centred on cotton Lancashire and steel Sheffield.  
By the late nineteenth century, Lancashire had evolved into the most 
sophisticated and specialised industrial district in the world, with high levels of 
vertical, and particularly spatial, specialisation. Indeed it coincided almost 
perfectly with economist, Alfred Marshall’s definition of the classic industrial 
district where, he observed,  
‘ When an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay 
there long; so great are the advantages which people following the same 
skilled trade get from near neighbourhood to one another. The mysteries of 
the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air, and children learn 
many of them unconsciously. Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and 
improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organisation of the 
business have their merits promptly discussed; if one man starts a new idea, it 
is taken by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it 
becomes the source of further good ideas. And presently subsidiary trades 
grow up in the neighbourhood…. Conducing to the economy of its material.’5
In nineteenth century Lancashire, the primary focus was textile production and 
individual communities concentrated on producing distinctive yarns and 
fabrics using technology that evolved synergistically.6 By the First World War 
interrelated business sectors were involved in the manufacture of over 300 
different fabric types, the production of synthetic dyestuffs, a strong printing 
and newsprint industry, textile finishing trades, coalmining, and a massive 
rubberised rainwear industry.7  
Manchester was far more than just an industrial town: it was the commercial 
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heart of a spatially specialised industry and the crucial link with the outside 
world. Manchester’s commercial sector acted as a conduit for intermediate 
goods and services with numerous shipping houses linking manufacturers 
with diverse national and international markets.8 The city was also the base 
for numerous other institutions that facilitated information flow. Its networks of 
information and commercial intelligence were brought together through the 
Manchester Royal Exchange, described as the ‘nerve centre’ of the industry. 9 
The wide range of merchant converters and finishing companies in the 
Manchester region were at the very heart of the Lancashire system. However, 
they meant that very few manufacturers had direct contact with their 
customers and user lead innovation was very rare. 10
Community development was especially linked to accumulated and distinctive 
capabilities tied to specific products, geared to particular markets. The 
expansion of south Lancashire’s spinning was closely linked to the perfection 
of steam power and the growth of textile engineering. Such interaction and 
skill building within Lancashire towns was reinforced by the ties between 
machine makers, who had inputs into the curriculum of local technical 
colleges. 11  
The development of machine tools, engineering and related skills in the 
Manchester region lay at the heart of Lancashire’s textile capability. 
Technology develops in an evolutionary path-dependent manner, shaped by 
past skills and the transfer of knowledge within industrial communities. The 
role of technology-based path dependence in business development is 
especially well illustrated by Lancashire’s engineering legacy. In the UK, after 
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centuries of craft-based evolution, the first machine shops were closely linked 
to the development of the steam engine in the eighteenth century, with its 
need for precision parts. In terms of Lancashire textiles, machine tool 
development was inextricably linked to the development of engineering 
aspects associated with the flexibility, versatility and sophistication of textile 
machinery that gave it competitive advantage. 12
Innovation in technology is crucially related to personal networks and the 
exchange of knowledge rather than to lone inventors. Within Lancashire, this 
was especially true for Joseph Whitworth. He was: 
Not an inventive genius but …sought out the best features of 
contemporary design, improved upon them and combined them in 
one masterly synthesis. 13  
Whitworth gained knowledge as a mechanic in the Manchester cotton industry 
in the 1810s and this was combined with knowledge gained from his 
employment with Henry Maudslay, the London based originator of screw 
cutting lathes. 14 The hallmark of his designs was they were made to the 
highest levels of precision of that time. For example, his 1850s machines 
could detect differences of one millionth part of an inch (which is considerably 
better than current general production machine tools). These machines 
provided the ability to make precision parts and this allowed for more the 
design and creation of more sophisticated textile machinery. The development 
of improved machine tools and mechanically more complex mechanisms was 
also supported by the use of standardised screw threads which was 
Whitworth’s other major contribution to Lancashire’s machine building 
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capability. The Whitworth thread form proved robust, easy to manufacture 
and, in spite of its relative coarseness is still in use today. These screw 
threads were to later play a fundamental role in the later development of 
climbing hardware in the 1950s. 
The company of Mather and Platt was a key industrial player in the 
formation of the Lancashire industrial region and its activities had a 
subsequent impact on design choices made in the outdoor trade. The 
company’s importance was increased through the active participation of Sir 
William Mather in the region’s economic and social development.15 The 
business was originally established at Salford Ironworks, which by 1795 was 
of considerable capacity and noted for its steam engines according to 
Boschi,16. Colin and William Mather had established a business as engineers, 
machine makers and millwrights, and later joined with the Platt family who had 
leased Salford Ironworks. In the early days, because of its foundry, Mather 
and Platt focused mainly on supplying goods for the textile finishing trades, 
rather than the smaller machine elements for spinning and weaving. William 
and Colin Mather were designers and entrepreneurs. They developed and 
manufactured dozens of new types of textile finishing machines.  
The business had a strong international focus, with Colin and William Mather 
making many overseas trips. Mather and Platt had central roles in the 
international development of textile industries of many other countries, notably 
Russia, India and America. This was to the point that Matherplatt became a 
generic term in textile printing (Matherplattieren in German and Plattning in 
Swedish). The nature of the technological choices made by the company and 
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the evolution of frame, shaft and roller–based machine technologies was to 
have a significant effect on design choices in the second half of twentieth 
century. 
Another path dependent factor running parallel with these improvements in 
machine making in the early 19th century, was the fundamental shift in the 
materials of machine making from wood to iron, both cast and wrought and 
thence to steel. This shift in materials and the associated move away from the 
wooden gearing of mills combined with, and supported, the development of 
new machine forms and new types of machinery. It brought changes in power 
transmission that were also crucial to the development of large complex multi-
machine arrangements that distributed the power from a single source 
throughout a building. In addition, the introduction of high-speed linked 
shafting made possible the later development of effective systems of process 
control of multiple sub-processes, in for example, cotton spinning, fabric 
treatment and printing.  
The industrial revolution was, of course, not confined to Lancashire and 
close relationships evolved with neighbouring industrial districts, including 
Sheffield, the home of specialist steel making. Sheffield’s skill and craft 
expertise had evolved over centuries and reached back to Roman times. 
Sheffield was the UK’s largest nineteenth century centre of specialist steels 
and in its heyday was the world’s largest cutlery centre, and a leading 
producer of specialist tools. The interface with Lancashire in the nineteenth 
century lay especially in tool steel –the steels which allow other materials to 
be shaped. They were of course used extensively by the machine tool makers 
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so crucial to Lancashire’s engineering industry. 17  
Industrial Legacy and Sporting Future 
Joseph Schumpeter has been described as the father of entrepreneurship 
and saw innovation as evolutionary and path dependent. He believed the 
trajectory of any innovation was intimately related to its historical context. He 
argued that creativity involves not necessarily developing something new, but 
having the imagination to see old things in new ways and to move ‘outside the 
ruts of established practice’. 18 Schumpeter’s innovation has normally been 
interpreted as a radical departure from past practice. However, more recent 
work, which draws on Schumpeter, emphasises the way in which the majority 
of innovations represent ‘new combinations- ‘combinations of old and new – 
old product and new process, old product and new material, old skills and new 
products. 19 New combinations of old skills, new materials and evolving 
sports, lay at the heart of the emergence of the internationally competitive 
outdoor sports companies which appeared on the Pennine fringes in the 
1960s. Innovative products appeared in which Lancashire and Sheffield 
industrial and technical knowledge was combined with sporting skill and 
needs at a time when the market for climbing and outdoor products was 
growing at an exceptional rate. 
In the 20th century, external changes, along with market, and technological 
shifts, undermined the industrial buoyancy of the two industrial clusters. By 
the 1970s, the NW textile industry was virtually dead, many mills demolished 
and Lancashire’s industrial past increasingly scrapped or consigned to the 
heritage industry.20 The relative decline of the Lancashire cotton industry 
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predated the First World War and gathered momentum during the interwar 
period. But absolute decline, when output, capacity and employment in 
spinning and weaving declined, began after 1939. Forces, including war-time 
utility schemes, inexperience in Continental European markets, collapse of 
the Indian textile market, supply side weaknesses, structural changes and 
government policy - lowered investment and made it hard for firms at the 
lower end of the market to shift in ways that might have stemmed the region’s 
decline. 21 But not all sectors of cotton textiles declined and nor were skills 
and accumulated knowledge lost. The textile finishing trades expanded during 
the 1950s and 1960s as demand for more specialist, protective and high 
performance fabrics rose. Sheffield’s decline was more protracted and in 1964 
the city was still the most famous name in steel and the city bore ‘all the 
hallmarks of its nineteenth century heyday’. However, a decade later changes 
in patterns of world demand and manufacturing generally and reduction in 
demand for alloy steels in particular were undermining Sheffield’s international 
standing. 22
The legacy of decline was more than decay, demolition and industrial 
museums. Some skills, such as cotton spinning and weaving became largely 
redundant as the cotton industry shifted to Asia. Others, combined in new 
ways with new materials and uses, evolved to contribute to design processes 
in a newly emerging sector –clothing and equipment for mountaineering. For 
example, at the very time that spindleage and loomage was being scrapped, 
the output of the coating trades grew from £50m in 1950 to £93.6m in 1970.23 
Path dependency and evolving communities of practice played a crucial role 
in the development of both Lancashire and Sheffield in the nineteenth century. 
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To a fair degree the decline of both industrial districts stemmed from ‘lock in’ 
in a rapidly changing world. Yet there was evidence of creative 
entrepreneurial responses, which combined the industrial legacy with a 
parallel sporting legacy, to develop innovative designs. 
Technological, social and institutional factors carried forward from the prior 
industrial context acted as selection criteria for the range of skills available 
after the collapse of the cotton and steel industries. These factors resulted in 
a bias toward skills, expertise and working practices that aligned well with the 
design, manufacture and marketing of innovative outdoor equipment and 
clothes. Technological selection factors acted, however, against other 
potential opportunities for the use of human and technological resources 
available after the collapse of the textile industry, reducing their tradable value 
(e.g. the main technologies were hard to relocate, and did not have easy 
technological transfer paths to other commercial activities). This lack of 
alternative use reduced the relative costs of these resources to entrepreneurs 
in the new outdoor equipment trade and increased its national and 
international competitiveness. 
The interrelated legacies of Lancashire and Sheffield were the knowledge and 
skills related finishing processes, engineering and specialist metals all of 
which in their different ways shaped design capabilities in newly emerging 
companies. There were residues from the decline of the Lancashire textile 
industry which impacted on the design of outdoor products. These were less 
the direct impact of the collapse of spinning and weaving, than the skills 
embedded in the ancillary trades – both textile finishing and engineering. 
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These skill bases especially impacted on companies like Karrimor and Troll.  
This relationship is not a simple linear one or related to cotton spinning or 
weaving per se. Instead it was linked closely to the high level of nineteenth 
century specialisation and the consequences this had for the shift to nylon in 
outdoor products in the 1960s and 1970s. Although there is strong evidence 
of path dependency, based on Lancashire’s cotton past, the process was 
often complicated. The shift from proofing cotton to nylon was not 
straightforward. Nylon, invented by Du Pont scientists in 1934 is not naturally 
a wet weather fabric. Unlike cotton, it does not matter how tightly it is woven, 
the nature of the fibres prevent it from retaining proofing for long. In steady 
rain, nylon fabrics/fibres do not swell after absorbing water and hence have no 
natural ability to repel water as compared with cotton. The consumer today 
assumes nylon is easier to proof than cotton. The opposite is true, and in the 
1970s they faced similar problems to Macintosh before 1850.24 .Indeed as a 
first step the coating manufacturers used a synthetic version of Macintosh's 
original rubber to facilitate a physical key to the fabric. However this was 
extremely heavy and unsuitable and as chemical technologies involved it was 
found possible to chemically bond the   polyurethane (PU) to the very shiny 
nylon fibres. 25.  The skills from Lancashire’s rainwear industry, especially 
those associated with coatings, undoubtedly played an important role in 
building the competitive advantage of companies like Peter Storm and 
Karrimor in the 1960s and 1970s and for Regatta in the 1990s. All these 
outdoor companies relied heavily upon the accumulated expertise of 
Lancashire suppliers of coatings- some old but some new, for the competitive 
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performance of their clothing or rucksacks in a changing world.  
Karrimor was founded in 1946 by Mary and Charlie Parsons to supply their 
Rawtenstall cycle shop with cycle bags. It began as a small workshop above 
the shop and when Mike Parsons joined the company in 1960 he was the 7th 
employee and turnover was 2/3 of the retail store. In building the business, 
Parsons gained a deep understanding of the manufacturing process and, 
based within old textile Lancashire of the capabilities of textiles and their 
associated processes. As an active sportsman he had a working knowledge 
and regular dialogue with mountaineers and those involved in outdoor 
pursuits. This bridge between technical knowledge and sporting needs played 
a crucial role in Karrimor’s growing dominance of the rucksack market. By 
1975 the company employed 163 workers and controlled 80% of the UK 
rucksack market, exporting 40% of its turnover. 26
Mike Parsons and his product manager Eddie Creig developed close 
relationships with the Lancashire textile industry and especially with coating 
companies over a 20 year period. As Eddie Creig explained: 
 ‘The basic point on any development [is] co-operation and experience. 
A sharing of knowledge. Although this is concerned with the development of 
fabrics the same careful co-operation exists between myself and our suppliers 
of zips, mouldings, met fasteners, foams etc’ 27
During the late 1960s Parsons began to shift rucksack production into 
nylon and encountered difficulties with the PU coating which regularly peeled 
off. This resulted in discussions with their supplier, Gordon and Fairclough of 
Darwen. This small company was founded in 1971 and had worked closely 
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with Courtaulds before moving into PU coatings. The discussions were robust 
and ultimately creative as Karrimor product manager, Eddie Creig, recalled: 
 ‘How can you expect to have the correct material if you don’t speak to 
the people who know what coated fabric is?' they asked. The resultant 
meetings always seemed to me the main reason why we have lead the field in 
our section of the leisure industry… In subsequent years I got to know the 
dyer that our coaters were using at that time. It was most important that the 
fabric was properly dyed and only by close contact between dyer and 
manufacturer (maker up) could he have a real understanding of what was 
required and why…’28
The result of this co-operation in 1979 was the introduction of KS-100e 
described as ‘a completely new rucksack fabric with a new elastomer coating’ 
It was the first fabric purpose designed for rucksacks’.29 Parsons is, however, 
clear that, while knowledge of coating and related chemical processes was a 
legacy of Lancashire’s industrial past, tapping into it involved a major break 
from past practice. Direct contact within the supply chain was not a feature of 
nineteenth century Lancashire which relied so heavily on specialist merchants 
at every stage. In addition, while the coating processes were a direct legacy 
from the nineteenth century, the chemistry involved in achieving a chemical 
bond between the PU coating compounds and nylon fibres was new. Once 
this was achieved, however, it was found that the coatings locked up the 
fibres together so strongly that the tear strength of the resulting coated fabric 
decreased significantly. It was 10-15 years before new types of the 
elastomeric coatings were developed which allowed the fabric to regain its 
 14
flexibility and hence its strength. KS-100e was the first such fabric to do that. 
30
 Textile processes were a vital part of the nineteenth century legacy but 
engineering and metal working skills and associated processes were also 
important. One particularly strong and foundational technological selection 
factor was the type of large-scale machinery technology used in the North 
West region. This comprised machinery composed of frames with large shafts 
and rollers, and was found across a wide range of industries. It is a 
technology underpinned by foundries, long and large diameter shaft/roller 
machining, precision tool making and simple process control. The underlying 
technologies of the innovations of engineering company, Mather and Platt 
were those of foundry and large machine making – particularly machines with 
cast iron frames, large shafts and circular machine elements such as rollers, 
gears, cylinders and wheels. These machines and their associated expertise, 
originally developed for textiles, became applied to other industries such as 
printing of lino, steam engines, industrial sewing machines, large volume 
generation of sterilising fluid by electrolysis, electric motors and machinery 
and food processing.31  
The opportunities offered by the existence and extent of this large roller 
machinery technology acted as selection criteria. Rather than closing, or 
transforming themselves radically, some businesses in the textile arena used 
the available machines and existing skill sets in new ways as an opportunity 
for the production of high-performance coated and treated fabrics described 
above which were so vital for companies like Karrimor. This in turn acted as 
criteria selecting against firms that did not utilise these opportunities in some 
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way, and reduced competition against firms that offered added value in the 
supply chain through designing products using high-performance fabrics. 
Karrimor could not have been more firmly embedded in Lancashire. Its early 
development involved combining old and new technologies, materials and 
skills with a far higher level of customer interaction than had been common in 
the cotton industry.  
The textile, engineering and metals legacy is only part of the regional story 
of the emergence of dynamic outdoor equipment companies. Mass 
participation in outdoor activities such as hill walking and cycling, began in the 
nineteenth century and grew strongly in the inter war period. But this did not 
result in a mass market since incomes were low. Before the Second World 
War, the competitive advantage of UK outdoor companies lay in tents and in 
wind proof clothing, anything more sophisticated was imported, and this 
continued to be the case in the immediate post war period. However a range 
of forces, including increasing leisure time, greater mobility and changing 
access laws, made outdoor activities more popular. The first ascent of Everest 
in 1953 made mountaineering more visible and, through its leader John Hunt, 
provided a vital boost to outdoor education in the UK. The outdoor education 
centres became a crucial bulk market for UK outdoor companies in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Demand continued to rise in the 1970s and 1980s, bolstered by 
the development of activities like backpacking, Scottish ice climbing and 
skiing. 
The Peak District was the heart of the growing level urban climbing and 
outdoor activity and this was important to innovation and design. The 
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Derbyshire Peak District, with its proximity to Manchester and Sheffield, 
became increasingly popular with urban, working class and lower middle class 
dwellers, during the interwar period. 10,000 walkers visited Derbyshire, mainly 
from the neighbouring conurbations, on a typical weekend in 1931, many 
becoming involved in the access movement and the Mass Trespass of 1932. 
32 British mountaineering had its origins in the nineteenth century among the 
moneyed, public school educated professional elites. The Peak climbers were 
a new breed who pursued very different ‘rules of the game’ and had different 
knowledge and skills. The slump which devastated industries like cotton and 
steel, in the interwar period, led to a sharp rise in unemployment in both 
Manchester and Sheffield. Many of them flocked to the Gritstone edges of the 
Peak District.  
‘Peakland mountaineering did not share the upper class origins of the sport 
elsewhere in Britain and the district surrounded by the great industrial masses 
of Sheffield, Nottingham, Derby, the Potteries and Manchester and its 
neighbours has been primarily a working-man’s playground, while Wasdale 
and Ogwen remained for a long time in the leisured atmosphere of the 
traditional climbing families and their friends, there grew up in the Peak 
District an independent tradition of hard walking and hard climbing that owed 
little to external influence’.33
After the Second World War this group emerged at the leading edge of 
British climbing and formed the crucial bridge between regionally based 
industrial skills and the design of innovative outdoor products. Prior to the 
1960s, most technical outdoor equipment, from rucksacks to climbing 
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hardware, was imported. 34 The emergence of this new group of climbers 
altered the profile of British climbing and influenced equipment development 
fundamentally. The Peak District climbers shared the outlook and background 
of Continental climbers who, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, had developed technical rock climbing in both the Western and 
Eastern Alps. 35 In the Alps, the combination of industrial, practical and 
climbing knowledge influenced innovative design of mountaineering hardware 
and other equipment. This trend was replicated in the areas bordering the 
Peak District.36 The emergence of communities of practice, where lead users 
innovate to meet their own personal needs, sometimes becoming lifestyle 
entrepreneurs, has been identified in other outdoor sports. 37 What is 
significant, in the case of the emergence of the British outdoor trade, was the 
extent to which this activity mapped onto the region’s industrial past. This 
manifested itself in a number of ways, including people who combined the 
knowledge of materials, manufacturing and craft processes with the demands 
of sport.  
Innovators are involved in the dance of two questions: what is needed and 
what is possible. The combination of the knowledge of the capabilities of 
materials, industrial processes and sporting needs was a creative mixture. It 
played a fundamental role in the innovation and design process in 
mountaineering and climbing equipment and in the raising of climbing 
standards in the UK from the 1950s onwards. Being entirely separate, socially 
and geographically, from the traditions of British mountaineering, the working 
class climbers ‘did not know what they were not supposed to do’. However, 
they recognised that their gritstone rocks needed technical climbing 
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equipment. In other words, the distinctive physical geography of the Peak, 
differed from the Lake District and North Wales, where the mountaineering 
elite typically climbed. This had a significant impact on equipment 
development after the Second World War. 
UK textile- related equipment for climbing and mountaineering was well 
developed by the 1960s and often many years in advance of Continental 
Europe. Climbing hardware, on the other hand, was 50 years behind. 38 Part 
of the reason for this lay in the ethics of the British climbing establishment, 
which abhorred artificial aids.  Another factor is the physical difference 
between most of the climbing areas favoured by the British climbing 
establishment and the Eastern Alps with its big walls , where many of the 
major climbing hardware innovations originated.  However, the creation of a 
new device-the nut -which did not damage the rock had a lasting impact on 
the development of climbing hardware design in the UK . The device was 
called a nut simply because the initial inspiration was an engineer’s nut with 
the thread removed.  
The sporting origin of the removable nut, to replace the piton (which was 
left on the rock face), came from the British practice of threading the rope 
through a small rock, which was naturally jammed in a crack. Many of the 
peak climbers worked in engineering workshops and collected Whitworth 
nuts, filing the threads from the inside, threading a nylon cord through them 
and using them instead of stones. The first manufactured nut, the Acorn, was 
made by climber John Brailsford, a one-time Sheffield steel apprentice and 
blacksmith, who was by 1961 working as a craft teacher in Derbyshire. By 
 19
using aluminium die casting, Brailsford went on to develop the much improved 
MOAC nut, one of the crucial innovations on which the UK mountain hardware 
industry was based. John Brailsford was not the only innovator in UK 
mountain hardware, but he became supporting master craftsman for many 
who came later. 39 This, combined with his shift into outdoor education and 
later mountain guiding, meant his knowledge had a disproportionate impact 
on developments in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The nut was initially sand cast but once the concept was established many 
different lead user's and lead user manufacturers explored the ‘design space’ 
to use a variety of different production techniques from exclusion to forging  
As has been the case in other sports, small lead user new entrants into 
manufacturing, subsequently developed companies with a worldwide 
reputation.40 The physical environment around the companies was very 
important to their founders, however. It meant they were able to climb in 
evenings, rather than waiting until the traditional free -time of weekends. 
 The interplay between practical manufacturing knowledge, 
craftsmanship and sport is not the only source of path dependence of design 
in UK outdoor products. The Peak District was the playground of outstanding 
working class climbers, who emerged as lead user innovators. Of these the 
best known were Don Whillans and Joe Brown, whose climbing expertise 
captured the nation’s imagination during the 1950s and 1960s. Intensely 
practical and trained a plumber, Don Whillans had an ‘analytical attitude to 
gear.’ according to Pete Hutchinson, owner of Mountain Equipment. He was a 
typical lead user designer- looking for the solutions to his own particular 
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climbing needs. 41 His classic designs included the Whillans Box, a high 
altitude tent developed for him by Karrimor and the Whillans sit harness 
developed with Troll, both of key importance to his move into high altitude 
climbing in the Himalayas in the 1960s. 42 Some lead users, like Whillans, 
were not remotely interested in becoming ‘life style’ entrepreneurs and were 
not interested in the business side of innovation. There were others, such as 
Tony Howard, one of the founders of Troll Products. He was a lead user, an 
innovator and subsequently a manufacturer.43 The company derived its name 
from the Troll Wall in Norway, climbed by Tony Howard and his climbing 
partners in 1965. 44
Troll Products was located in a small wooden shed in Greenfield, West 
Yorkshire. Greenfield is a small ex-textile town on the Lancashire side of the 
Pennines. Historically, its industrial significance lay in its location at the 
intersection of roads from Manchester to Huddersfield and Holmfirth, and the 
Huddersfield Narrows canal with its technologically impressive 5km 
Standedge tunnel that provided the key transport link across England from the 
Mersey to the Humber estuaries. Waist belts, Troll’s first products, were a 
direct response to the technical climbing development taking place on Peak 
District gritstone from the 1950s onwards. The shift toward aid climbing meant 
that climbers were carrying more gear and were tying a rope around their 
waist. The waist belts replaced this and allowed them to carry more. The 
design of these simple belts was also linked to the decline of the textile 
industry, because they were made of old leather belting from local textile mills, 
although later on this was replaced by nylon webbing. 45 By 1968 Troll 
Products’ workshop comprised three small-interconnected sections, each 
 21
about 8 ft (2.5m) square: office, machine shop, and store/polishing room. The 
business’s products around 1968 mainly comprised: ‘chocks’ (a wide range of 
metal wedges used in safety protection by climbers), etriers (short ladders for 
climbers made of nylon tape and stiffened with polystyrene cement), cagoules 
(knee length waterproof smock made from polyurethane coated nylon with 
stitched and glued seams). 46
 In 1969 Troll was approached by Don Whillans about the development of 
what became the sit-harness for high altitude resting during climbs. 
‘There were no sit-harnesses on the market and Don came up with the idea 
of a fabric seat linked into the waist belt. We played around with Don’s idea 
and took the fabric out and replaced with web. Eventually we came up with 
the basic Whillans harness still using mill belting. Although it was initially 
slagged off by the journalists it took off and nothing replaced it until 1978’. 47
During this period the company did modify and improve the sit harness but it 
became the dominant design internationally, as well as in the UK.  
 Karrimor and Troll were among the pioneer UK outdoor companies in 
the 1960s but they shared another characteristic. They were among the 
suppliers of Chris Bonington’s 1970 expedition to Annapurna, an expedition 
which was a turning point for both British mountaineering and British outdoor 
companies. In climbing terms, the techniques of big wall and technical 
climbing developed in Continental Europe and America had been further 
improved by Britain’s new breed of climbers. But the high profile media 
coverage turned the suppliers into international brands overnight. In a 
retrospective interview, Tony Howard confirmed he saw Annapurna South 
Face as the key turning point for his company’s development through the high 
profile of the sit harness on photographs, on TV and in the lectures. 48 But this 
was not just publicity hype, as the sit harness was a break through which 
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started a whole new level of safety and performance in climbing. Bonington 
described it as: 
‘An outstanding success, for it enabled one to rest back in the seat while 
jumaring up snow slopes.’ 49
Annapurna 1970 had a similar impact on Karrimor for rucksacks, the Whillans 
box – the special aluminium framed high altitude tent designed to Whillans’ 
specification and made by Karrimor using pack frame technology- and the 
Karrimat. So great was the level of publicity that the company struggled to 
keep up with demand.50 Neither company could have survived long had their 
only market been just leading edge climbing, however high profile. The market 
is tiny and some of the innovations –such as the Whillans Box- did not diffuse. 
However, the expeditions enhanced the companies’ reputation for 
functionality and usability, crucial in the emerging bulk markets linked to 
outdoor education and backpacking during the 1970s. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that design choices in the UK outdoor trade 
were informed by combinations of past technology and expertise, market 
opportunity and overlapping networks and the physical geography of the 
surrounding Pennines. It highlights the ways in which path dependency 
shaped design choices in the UK outdoor trade after 1960. Many of the 
problems of declining industrial districts such as the Lancashire cotton 
industry or Sheffield steel industries can be tracked to the lock in of past 
technological and industrial choices. This article has shown that path 
dependency also impacts on decision to innovate and develop new sectors. A 
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number of internationally competitive companies emerged whose competitive 
advantage was inextricably linked to the industrial skills and technologies of 
the past. Innovation came from new ways of utilising these skills and from 
combining them with the development of sport. The article demonstrates the 
interplay between Lancashire, Sheffield and the development of climbing in 
the UK after the Second World War. The mixture of these three sources of 
knowledge became crucially important to the innovation process in the new 
outdoor companies. This interplay provided the platform for know 
combinations of expertise, the blending of tacit knowledge and the mixing of 
manufacturing and sporting innovation. The proximity of Lancashire and 
Sheffield to one of the most creative areas of British technical climbing and 
outdoor activity was critical in this process. Declining industrial regions are 
normally associated with industrial museums. It is perhaps a reflection of 
Sheffield continuing position as one of the hearts of the British climbing 
community that in 1991 one of its old foundries became the Foundry Climbing 
Centre.  
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